Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CGU Faculty Publications and Research

CGU Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2015

Narco-Submarines. Specially Fabricated Vessels
Used For Drug Smuggling Purposes
Byron Ramirez
Claremont Graduate University

Robert J. Bunker
Claremont Graduate University

Recommended Citation
Bunker, R. J. (2015). Narco-Submarines. Specially Fabricated Vessels Used For Drug Smuggling Purposes. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign
Military Studies Office. 1-164

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in CGU Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

E
ANC

KNOWLEDGE IS
ME
RE
T

E
TN
NN
KE

CO
N

ISS

K

NA

OC

POZNAVANJE
TO
IEN
IM

ISSE 3HAHИE WIE
DZ
A

CO

CIMENTO ZNALO
STI
NHE

CO
N

Narco-Submarines
Specially Fabricated Vessels Used For Drug Smuggling Purposes
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, Editors

In cooperation with
InSight Crime &
Small Wars Journal— El Centro

Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source
research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that
brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics
derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special
insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives
of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered.

Editors’ Background
Byron Ramirez is a political economy analyst who specializes in international political and
economic affairs. He is a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics and Political Science at Claremont
Graduate University and holds an M.A. in Economics, a M.S. in Management, and an MBA. He
is presently an intern with Small Wars Journal—El Centro. His areas of research include
geopolitics, globalization, economic and social development, and informal economies. His most
recent publication is the co-edited work Narco Armor: Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicles
in Mexico. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office.
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is Distinguished Visiting Professor and Minerva Chair at the Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is also adjunct faculty, Division of Politics and
Economics (SPE), Claremont Graduate University and a senior fellow with Small Wars Journal—
El Centro. His many publications (over 200) include books, reports, articles, essays, response
guidance, subject bibliographies, and encyclopedia entries in academic, policy, military, and law
enforcement publications; he has also served as the editor for a number of collections of articles.
Among those are (with Steve Sloan) Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training (Oklahoma
University Press 2011) and the edited works including Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the
Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War (Routledge 2012); Narcos Over the Border: Gangs,
Cartels and Mercenaries (Routledge 2011); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (Routledge
2008); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgencies (Routledge 2005); and Non-State Threats
and Future Wars (Routledge 2003).

FMSO has provided some formatting to this paper to conform to organizational standards.
Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author(s).
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official policy or position
of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

2

Contents
PREFACE
James G. Stavridis

4

EDITORS’ NOTE
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker

6

INTRODUCTION: NARCO SUBMARINES
Robert J. Bunker and Byron Ramirez

9

1.
2.
3.

RAWFEED: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG SUBMARINE
Hannah Stone

25

THE RISE OF THE NARCO NAVY
Adam Elkus

27

THE EVOLUTION OF ‘NARCO-SUBMARINES’ ENGINEERING
Byron Ramirez

29

4.

NARCO-SUBMARINES: APPLYING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO DRUG
SMUGGLING
Byron Ramirez
33

5.

TRAJECTORIES, CONTINUITIES AND DISPLACEMENTS IN THE BIOGRAPHY
OF ‘NARCO-SUBS’: FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO THE PACIFIC 1993-2013
Javier Guerrero Castro
38

POSTSCRIPT
Mark F. Morris

46

PICTURE GALLERY

51

MAP OF INTERDICTIONS

140

APPENDIX
A. TESTIMONY OF THE DIRECTOR JIATF-SOUTH (19 JUNE 2012)

143

B. MAP OF AREA WHERE NARCO SUBMARINES ARE BUILT IN COLOMBIA

150

C. MAP OF MOVEMENT OF COCAINE INTO THE U.S.

151

NOTES

152

REFERENCES

158

CONTRIBUTORS

163

3

PREFACE
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret)
Admiral Stavridis served as Commander of US Southern Command 2006-2009 and was Supreme
Allied Commander at NATO 2009-2013. He is currently serving as the 12th Dean of The
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

May 2014
Narcotics are moving at sea in relatively sophisticated nautical craft beneath the waves – we need
to understand their capabilities and intent. This volume is a fine start.
For several decades, law enforcement agencies and the militaries in the Western hemisphere have
focused on developing strategies that will allow them to thwart the efforts of drug trafficking
organizations and mitigate the flow of drugs into our great nation.
In close partnership with its allies, the United States has acquired a rich store of experience in
activities aimed at disrupting the activities of criminal organizations. In spite of the success of
Operation Martillo targeting illicit trafficking routes in coastal waters along the Central American
isthmus, the flow of illicit drugs into the United States continues at a high level.
Just over 20 years ago, narco-submarines emerged as an alternative method of transporting
narcotics. This study is important and relevant to the present challenges faced by law enforcement
authorities and militaries as it specifically focuses on these specially fabricated vessels that have
been used for drug smuggling purposes.
This effort adds value to the existing literature on the subject as it contains several essays which
describe the complexity of the challenges that narco-submarines present. The document also
provides the background and context behind the emergence of these vessels. Furthermore, the
work illustrates the evolution of narco-submarine technology and the advances in their design,
features, and technical capabilities.
Another important contribution of this paper is the extensive and comprehensive photo gallery,
arranged in chronological order, which allows the reader to observe the evolution of narcosubmarine technologies.
While this is a volume that will be of general interest to anyone with an interest in global security,
the intended readers are military, homeland security, and law enforcement personnel who wish to
learn more about these vessels and their respective capabilities. Policymakers and analysts may
also find the work useful for understanding the detection and interdiction challenges that these
vessels generate.
Finally, it is important that we collectively consider the potential of these types of vessels to
transport more than just narcotics: the movement of cash, weapons, violent extremists, or, at the
darkest end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction.
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This paper, by increasing the area of knowledge about narco-submarines, should enrich and deepen
our understanding of the threat they pose to our domestic security, and indeed to the global
commons.
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EDITORS’ NOTE
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker
May 2014
This paper is intended to be an initial primer on the subject of narco-submarines, that is, those
specially fabricated vessels utilized principally by Colombian narco traffickers and developed to
smuggle cocaine into the U.S. illicit drug market. The work falls within the Foreign Military
Studies Office (FMSO) mandate of unclassified research conducted on defense and security issues
that are understudied or under-considered. As a result, this venue was chosen to distribute the
information it contains and is meant to be a follow up on to the earlier collaborative effort Narco
Armor: Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicles in Mexico published by FMSO.
A couple of short comments will be provided in the Editors’ Note to offer some context and
background for the reader on this topical issue and to help them become better informed on this
subject matter.
Cocaine smuggling from the Andean region of South America to the United States generates yearly
revenues in the high tens of billions of dollars (e.g. 2008 UN estimate of USD $88 billion retail)
and over the last thirty-five years has produced in the low trillions of dollars in retail sales. The
use of narco-subs and related vessels represents one component of a broader illicit distribution
strategy that also relies upon go-fast boats, airplanes, the hiding of narcotics inside bulk containers
and smaller commodities, drug mules, and other techniques to covertly get this high value product
into the U.S. The main global flows of cocaine into the U.S. and other destinations can be viewed
in the 2010 UNODC World Drug Report 2010 [1]:

In fact, as of June 2012, maritime drug smuggling accounts for 80% of the total illicit flow from
the Andean region into Honduras, Mexico and other mid-way transportation regions prior to entry

6

into the U.S. [2]. About 30% of the maritime flow is estimated by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to utilize narco submarines [3]. Overall, however, maritime interdiction
rates are very low. In March 2014, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command testified to
Congress that:
“Last year, we had to cancel more than 200 very effective engagement activities
and numerous multilateral exercises, Marine Corps Gen. John F. Kelly told
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
And because of asset shortfalls, Southcom is unable to pursue 74 percent of
suspected maritime drug trafficking, the general said.
“I simply sit and watch it go by,” he continued. “And because of service cuts, I
don’t expect to get any immediate relief, in terms of assets, to work with in this
region of the world.” [4].
As a result, it can be seen that narco-submarines and related maritime drug trafficking methods are
being carried out with relative impunity, with only about 1 in 4 craft presently being interdicted.
Given this context concerning the immense values associated with the cocaine trade to the U.S.
and the large amount of these illicit drugs not being interdicted during the initial leg in their journey
to the United States, we now turn our attention to the paper which focuses on these specially
fabricated vessels themselves. The work contains, in addition to this note, a preface, introduction,
and a number of short essays discussing and analyzing narco-submarines. The majority of the work
is then comprised of a picture gallery containing over 30 distinct narco-subs that have been
identified. It also contains a map and a table that highlights where these distinct narco subs were
interdicted, an appendix, endnotes, a reference listing, and, finally, biographies of the contributors
to the work.
It should be noted that, in addition to this paper, it is recommended that a number of highly
informative videos on this subject matter be viewed as supporting audio-visual material. They are
as follows:
• Go Inside a Drug Submarine With the Narco Sub Godfather. Run time: 27:42
minutes. Original air date: July 4, 2010. Motherboard.
• Cocaine Sub Hunt. Run time: 50:00 minutes. Original air date: June 28, 2011.
National Geographic Channel.
• Inside Cocaine Wars: Narco Sub Mystery. 1 Season 2013. Run time: 45:57
minutes. Original air date: April 7, 2013. National Geographic Channel.
Of course, additional narco-submarine audio-visual resources in both English and Spanish exist
on the web in short news clips and related postings. For readers who wish to do even more research
on this topic, a listing of very useful narco-submarine essays and videos can be found in the
references section of this paper.
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The editors would like to thank Steven Dudley and Dave Dilegge for their support in this important
project, and the contributors to this work—Adam Elkus, Javier Guerrero Castro, Mark F. Morris,
James G. Stavridis, and Hannah Stone —for their past and present work on this topic. This paper
would not have been possible without the cooperation of the online sites InSight Crime
(insightcrime.org) and Small Wars Journal—El Centro (smallwarsjournal.com) which have
provided reprint permission for their writings. In addition, many of the images found in the picture
gallery were drawn from numerous OSINT sources, including Covert Shores
(covertshores.blogspot.com) and other online news and governmental websites, numerous images
were also provided by Captain Mark F. Morris, and all were then fused together and expanded to
create a meta image gallery for this publication. Finally, we would like to thank the Foreign
Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, for its support in publishing this document
and seeing its value vis-à-vis our need to better understand all elements of the ongoing criminal
insurgencies in Mexico and other regions of Latin America.
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INTRODUCTION: NARCO-SUBMARINES
Robert J. Bunker and Byron Ramirez
May 2014
Drug cartels today are much more organized, adaptive, and strategic. Over time, they have
acquired vast financial resources that allow them to invest in technologies geared towards
providing them with a strategic edge. Drug cartels have learned to adapt to a changing environment
where law enforcement authorities and militaries are also seeking to find their own effective ways
of disrupting the flow of illicit drugs. Technology has become a source of competitive advantage
and both drug cartels and militaries have been investing in engineering and technological tools that
will allow them to counteract one another.
On one side, drug cartels attempt to optimize their operational efficiency while mitigating the risk
of detection, seizure, and capture. On the other side, we have law enforcement and militaries’
efforts to improve their surveillance and detection capabilities. This race to out-flank and
counteract one another has led to the development of narco-submarines.
During the past twenty years, Colombia’s various drug cartels have engaged in investing in and
developing narco-submarine technology that will yield a competitive edge. Over time, their
increasing need to evade capture and confiscation of narcotics led drug cartels to move away from
using go-fast boats and planes, and instead turn towards developing in-house, homemade, custom
built narco-submarines.
A narco-submarine (also called narco-sub) is a custom-made, self-propelled vessel built by drug
traffickers to smuggle their goods. Over the years, their engineering, design and technology have
improved, thus making them more difficult to detect and capture. Moreover, from a cost-benefit
perspective, the yielded benefits are far superior to the associated costs of building these vessels.
Although militaries and law enforcement agencies have become progressively collaborative in
their efforts to reduce the flows of narcotics, the use of narco-submarines enables narcotics to
continue to reach their destinations while reducing the probability of detection. Albeit, there have
been some confiscations of narco-submarine vessels over the last several years.
These
appropriations in turn have led to our understanding of how narco-submarines are designed,
engineered, and used to deploy narcotics.
Narco-subs can be generally divided into three categories: Low Profile Vessels (LPV) / SelfPropelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersibles / Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV), and Narco
Torpedoes (the towed variety). The third and fourth essays in this paper will fully discuss these
categories of vessels – thus, for this introduction our interest is to focus on the actual numbers and
estimates concerning these cocaine smuggling craft and related issues.
However, before providing this information, a fourth type of smuggling vessel Static Narco
Containers / Torpedoes (aka Parasitic Devices), should be quickly mentioned. These containers
which are conceptually and functionally related to narco-subs—though passive in nature—are
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bolted or magnetically placed on the bottom of freighters and other large cargo ships by cartel and
organized crime frogmen. They hitch a ride from South American ports (Colombian and possibly
others) into ports in Mexico and the United States, and now it also appears that they are being
transported into Europe, where cartel divers in the receiving port recover the illicit narcotics that
they contain. While these containers are outside of the topical focus of this paper, a couple of
pictures of them will be provided below for informational purposes and to provide context for the
reader concerning a drug smuggling technology related to that of narco-subs.

Example of a bolt on static container used to smuggle cocaine on the underside of a cargo ship.
Provided by U.S. ICE/DHS; Undated Photo (pre-March 2011) [1]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/28/AR2011022801199.html.

In May 2014, drugs were found beneath a ship which had sailed from Colombia to Scotland. Police
discovered 108 kg of narcotics in the rudder area of Cape Maria, moored 2.8 miles from Largs,
North Ayrshire.
National Crime Agency authorities also seized diving equipment, a rigid
inflatable boat and an underwater scooter. The ship had been waiting to berth at Hunterston
terminal when officers from Police Scotland and the Border Force moved in. Dutch authorities
were also involved in the operation. [2]
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April 2013 interdiction of narco torpedo (left bottom corner) attached to a cargo ship in
Rotterdam port. The device contained 101kg of cocaine with an estimated street value of up to 7
million euros [3].
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/10021140/Narco-torpedoesand-frogmen-drug-smuggling-ring-busted-in-Rotterdam.html.

Governmental Numbers (and Estimates)
When viewing governmental narco-submarine numbers and estimates, the OSINT information is
fragmentary at best due to its sensitive nature. Thirty-six estuary and open sea Colombian
interdictions of semi-submersibles are said to have taken place between 1993 and 2009 per Captain
Mario Rodriguez, Commander of the Pacific Coast Guard [4]. This is very much in contrast to
these 2011 Colombian figures:
Colombian officials have seized 63 submersible and semi-submersible submarines
since 1993.
“We have developed systems that allow us to detect the [submarines],” Adm.
Álvaro Echandía, the former National Army Commander, said last month. “In
2009, we captured 20; in 2010, six and so far this year [we have] eight” [5].
These are slightly less than these somewhat later 2011 figures — “Since 1993 authorities have
seized 66 semi-submersibles used to smuggle drugs, including seven in 2011, according to the
Colombian navy” [6].
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To these above figures more detailed Colombian interdiction information provided concerning
seizures to 2012 in a National Geographic documentary yields the following statistics:
• 2 vessels found near the Gulf of Uraba
• 5 vessels found near Buenaventura
• 10 vessels found near Sanquianga National Park
• 10 crews in vessels captured at sea [7].
It is unclear, however, if a few submersible estuary (prior to launch) seizures have not in fact been
counted in both the 2009 and 2012 information provided. Still, the Colombian figures suggest their
interdiction numbers range from about thirty narco-subs to well into the sixties.
From the U.S. side, per the testimony of Rear Admiral Charles Michel, JIATF-South Director, in
June 2012, the following statistics pertaining maritime contact numbers and interdictions are
provided:
JIATF-South detected an SPSS [Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles] at sea for the
first time in 2006. By 2009, the interagency detected as many as 60 SPSS events
were moving as much as 330 metric tons per year. Prior to 2011, SPSS had only
been employed by traffickers in the Eastern Pacific. However, since July 2011,
JIATF-South has supported the disruption of five SPSS vessels in the Western
Caribbean, each carrying more than 6.5 metric tons of cocaine.
There have been a total of 214 documented SPSS events, but only 45 were disrupted
due largely to the difficulty of detecting such low-profile vessels [8].
It is unknown how the thirty to sixty something Colombian interdictions relate to the forty-five
JIATF-South interdictions concerning overlapping incidents and how semi-submersibles vis-à-vis
true submersible interdictions are presented in these figures.
The numbers of these vessels which now exists is also highly debatable with potentially dozens of
them being produced every year by criminal organizations in Colombia such as the FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), Rastrojos, and Urabeños [9] [10]. One point greatly
influencing the numbers of these vessels which exist at any specific time is if they are utilized once
and then scuttled after their delivery (the traditional U.S. military viewpoint) or if they are utilized
multiple times (the traditional Colombian military viewpoint). Depending on the perspective held,
greater or lesser numbers of narco subs would be required to be produced each year to replenish
the vessels lost due to capture, accidental sinking, intentional-scuttling to avoid capture, and,
potentially most importantly, at the end of a delivery run.
What is known is that the capability of these vessels has grown over the last two decades with their
evolution and, if the Colombian cartels’ dream of making the journey (using fully submersible
narco-subs) to West Africa and Europe is realized, such subs would very well represent a valuable
cross Atlantic trafficking resource that would not likely be scuttled at the end of such a profitable
illicit trade route [11] [12].
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Vigo Submarine
In August 2006, Spanish authorities seized a narco submarine off Spain’s Atlantic coast, near Vigo.
According to reports, the traffickers were followed by Spanish authorities for months. Once
authorities had gathered enough evidence and received information that a shipment of cocaine
from South America was about to arrive, they proceeded to make the arrests and confiscate the
vessel.
The narco-submarine was intended to serve as a ferry vessel that would have met a larger vessel
in mid sea. The failed plan intended for the traffickers to transfer a load of 6,000 kilos of cocaine
into the narco-submarine and then bring it to shore. The narco-submarine was carrying 4,400 liters
of fuel when seized which suggests that it had the extended range to deliver the illicit product to
other European shorelines. Authorities indicate that the arrested were Spanish traffickers who
were working alongside a South American drug cartel [13] [14].

http://www.farodevigo.es/sucesos/2008/03/13/red-narcosubmarino-vigo-preparaba-alijo-6000kilos-coca/207700.html

http://www.farodevigo.es/sucesos/2011/01/11/red-narcosubmarino-abandonado-ria-vigoenfrenta-121-anos-carcel/507645.html

13

Analysis Based on the Picture Gallery (Interdiction Data Set)
Based on visual evidence derived from the picture gallery, we have in essence amassed an
interdiction data set. The picture gallery presented later in this paper specifies the individual
vessel’s date and location of interdiction. Based on our research, a total of 33 specific vessels have
been identified with several other vessels whose date and location of interdiction cannot be
determined.
Exhibits 1 through 4 below show interdictions recorded during the past several years. Although
some reports suggest that more vessels have been captured over the years, without specifying a
number, the physical visual evidence (picture gallery) assembled using several sources has yielded
the data represented in the figures that follow.

Exhibit 1
Narco Vesselsʼ Interdictions
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0
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Exhibit 1 shows the number of narco vessel interdictions per year (between the period 1993 thru
2013) by vessel type (LPV; Semi-Submersible; and Submersible). Source: Editors’ calculation
In recent years, there have been more interdictions while drug cartels continue to increase their use
of narco vessels. Our data set shows 33 distinct narco vessels (see picture gallery) that have been
seized. The majority of the seized vessels are LPVs (Low Profile Vessels) which represent 22 of
the 33 vessels in our sample. The second highest number of interdictions (10) falls under the
Submersibles category.
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Exhibit 2
Seized Narco Vessels
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Exhibit 2 illustrates the increase (upward trend) in the number of total seized narco vessels during
the past 20 years (1993 thru 2013). Source: Editors’ calculation

Exhibit 3
Seized Vessels (1993-2013)
Semi-Submersible

Submersible

LPVs

Submersible
10

LPVs
22
SemiSubmersible
1

Exhibit 3 shows a visual proportional break-down of seized narco vessels (by vessel type) during
the last 20 years. Source: Editors’ calculation
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Exhibit 4
INTERDICTIONS TABLE

Type
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

SemiSubmersible
1

Total

1

Submersible
1
1

LPVs

1

1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
3
4
5
3
2
7
1
2

22

33

1

1

1
3
4
4
3
1
5

1
1
2
1
1
10

Total

Exhibit 4 is an interdiction table which shows the total number of narco submarine vessels (by
vessel type) interdicted each year between the years 1993 and 2013. Source: Editors’ calculation
The interdiction table above suggests that, since 2006, there has been a clear increase in the number
of interdictions. This hints that the cartels just before and around 2006 may have started using
narco vessels with greater frequency. Perhaps more vessels were interdicted in recent years due
to the greater number of vessels that authorities came across. Moreover, the data seems to propose
that cartels have been using different types of narco-submarines concurrently; hence, they seem to
be employing a mixed strategy.
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The following cost-benefit analysis table (Exhibit 5) has been prepared by the editors using sources
that reveal approximate financial figures.

Exhibit 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis
Vessel Category

Description

Cost of Manufacturing

Advantages

Disadvantages

Semi-submersibles

These vessels are
capable of ballasting
down to lower their
surface profile and
controlling their
running depth, but
cannot fully submerge.

It is estimated that the cost
of building these was
approximately $1 Million
USD.

Can control running
depth and direction.
Capable of carrying
2 tons of narcotics
(worth around $40
Million USD).

Can be detected
rather easily relative
to LPVs and
submarines as they
cannot submerge
fully.

Submersible:
Submarine

Submarine with selfpropulsion capability
and ability to
submerge fully under
water. Equipped with
advanced radar, GPS,
navigational
technology. Invisible
on radar and infrared
when below the
surface.

Approx. $2 to 4 Million
USD

Can travel at a speed
of 11 mph for a
distance of 2,000
miles (3,200 km)
while carrying 10
tons of narcotics
(worth around $200
Million USD).
Almost undetectable
as they are capable
of diving 30 feet
under the surface.

Most expensive to
design, develop and
build. Take some
time to build,
require many parts
to manufacture, as
well as someone
with knowledge and
skills.

Submersible:
Torpedo

A covert
transportation torpedo
canister which is
towed by another
vessel.

Approx. $250 K to $500K
USD

Can travel at a depth
of about 30 meters at
almost the speed that
‘towing’ vessel is
travelling. Capable
of carrying 2 to 5
tons.

Not able to control
direction as they are
unmanned. They
rely on towing
vessel. Reduced
carrying capacity.

Low Profile
Vessels (LPVs)

Resemble the shape of
sealed ‘go-fast’ boats.
Their design has
improved, making
them lower to the
water surface and
almost completely
submergible.
Equipped with
navigation systems,
anti-radar features, and
water-cooled mufflers.

Approx. $750 K to
$1 Million USD

Can carry up to 10
tons of narcotics
(worth around $200
Million USD). Have
300 hp motor. Built
mostly from
fiberglass. Stealthy
design and upper
lead shielding helps
to minimize their
heat signature. Carry
a crew of five.

They are not able to
submerge fully
under water. They
can be detected
from the air.
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NARCO-VESSELS: CATEGORIES
Narco-subs can be generally divided into three categories; Low Profile Vessels (LPV) / SelfPropelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS), Submersibles / Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV), and Narco
Torpedoes (the towed variety).
Below we present additional information on each of these three categories along with their own
respective set of accompanying diagrams.
Note: All diagrams presented in the immediate section below via:
http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-andsemi.html?spref=tw&m=1 [Blogger LZ]. No updates to the site for some years now.

Semi-Submersibles
These vessels are capable of ballasting down to lower their surface profile, and controlling their
running depth, but not fully submerging. These are rare with only a few ever been captured.
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Submersibles (FSVs)
Type A: Submarine with self-propulsion (self-propelled) capability. This is the most advanced
category and hence the most expensive to develop and build. Fully submersibles are very rare.
Only a few have ever been captured. Due to sporadic evidence, it is difficult to project how many
of this type of vessels are currently employed. Based on the detected vessels to date, there does
not seem to be any clear evidence of successful operation of fully submersible submarines.
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Size Progression (comparison):
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Narco-Torpedoes
Type B: Towed 'Torpedo' - covert transportation canister towed by disguised vessel.
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Low Profile Vessels (LPVs)
The first low profile vessels (LPVs) boats resembled sealed ‘go-fast’ boats which simply rode
lower in the water. The usual arrangement of these vessels had a cabin at the rear and cargo hold
amidships. However, over time the LPV’s configuration has been modified resulting in a
specialized hull form with generally pointed bow and stern, with small cabin amidships, an engine
compartment located in the rear of the vessel, and narcotics cargo placed in every available space.
These LPVs were designed to run awash to minimize radar cross-section. They are often
incorrectly described as “semi-submersible”. They represent the vast majority of seized drug
smuggling vessels to date.
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SECTION 1:
RAWFEED: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG SUBMARINE
Hannah Stone
InSight Crime
Originally published 8 March 2011
Following the discovery in February of Colombia’s first fully submersible “narco-submarine,”
built by drug cartels to ship cocaine through the Pacific to the United States via Central America
and Mexico, the Colombian newspaper El Pais has produced a special report on the evolution of
submersible and semi-submersible drug-trafficking vessels, whose increased use demonstrates not
only the creativity of drug gangs in finding a way to get their products to market, but the extent of
their resources in being able to privately construct such sophisticated devices.
The emergence of the semi-submersible followed work by U.S. and Colombian authorities to
increase maritime interdiction in the Pacific in the 1990s and 2000s, with sea patrols and radar
tracking managing to intercept many of the speedboats or so-called “go-fast” the traffickers used.
The traffickers had to come up with a new method: traveling below the surface of the water.
Initially, as Colombian Rear Admiral Hernando Wills explains in an interview in the video
attached below, the boats were semi-submersibles that were crudely designed like go-fast boats
with another hull placed on top to allow them to travel just beneath the water’s surface.
Wills describes the first discovery of one of these crafts, which took place in 1993 on the
Colombian island of Providencia. The craft was “very rudimentary,” the navy officer says, with
the capacity to carry just one ton of cocaine.
Later versions sunk slightly deeper and were often constructed from fiberglass in order to make
them hard to detect by radar. And the vessels would have a system of drainage valves to make
them easy to scuttle if intercepted, sending the evidence to the bottom of the sea.
The latest seizures, however, illustrate a rapid evolution in capabilities. In contrast to these early
attempts, the submarine found in the southwest province of Cauca in February is 30 meters long
and three meters wide, and can carry four crew members in its air-conditioned interior, which even
features a small kitchen. Perhaps most importantly, it can carry eight tons of cocaine, dive eight
meters underwater, and reach all the way to the coast of Mexico, with only a periscope remaining
above the surface (see El Pais’ diagram).
This was the second such privately-constructed fully-functional submarine discovered, after the
July 2010 finding of such a craft in Ecuador close to the Colombian border. That submarine could
go 20 meters deep, and carry 10 tons of cocaine.
Such capacity is a game changer. A 2008 U.S. military Southern Command report predicted that semisubmersible vessels would soon be able carry 330 tons north each year or close to half of all cocaine
moving north.
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There is some evidence this may already be the case. A 2010 United Nations report on The
Globalization of Crime said that in 2008, 46 percent of all cocaine seized by Colombia in the
Pacific was found on semi-submersibles. With the U.S. estimating that 69 percent of cocaine
entering the country in 2007 left Colombia via the Pacific, semi-submersibles have in the last few
years been responsible for a very sizeable proportion of the global cocaine trade.
However, the subs represent something that goes beyond their capability to carry drugs. They are
home-made, privately built by drug traffickers in makeshift jungle workshops. The amount of
funds needed to set about such a project is huge, with navy personnel estimating that the Cauca
submarine likely cost more than two million dollars to build. This ability to invest and take on
long-term, high-value projects is a warning of the traffickers’ high level of resources and
organization.
The increased use of submersibles and semi-submersibles is highlighted in the UN’s International
Narcotics Control Board’s latest annual report, which says that the use of semi-submersibles for
drug trafficking has “strongly increased” in recent years, quoting Colombian government figures
that while 19 such vessels were seized worldwide between 1993 and 2007, 34 were seized in 2008
and 2009 alone.
Colombia’s territory bordering the Pacific provides the ideal environment to construct and hide a
submarine, as much of it is wild and remote country criss-crossed with rivers and jungles. Much
of the region is under the influence of drug trafficking organizations such as the Rastrojos, with a
heavy presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), particularly the rebels’ 29th Front in Nariño and 30th
Front in Choco.
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-evolution-of-the-drug-submarine
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SECTION 2:
THE RISE OF THE NARCO NAVY
Adam Elkus
USNI News
Originally published 15 June 2012
Updated 5 February 2013
Somali pirates and Iranian irregular warfare craft are well known to naval audiences, but the narco
navy deserves equal infamy for its drug-smuggling operations in the Americas. Both crude selfpropelled semi submersibles and full makeshift submarines are complicating drug interdiction in
the Americas. The United States and international partners have responded with network-centric
surveillance, tracking, and interdiction efforts, but seaborne interdiction operations are ultimately
adjuncts to the more expansive interdiction missions conducted on the U.S.-Mexican border itself
and the counternarcotics operations run throughout Central and Latin America by the U.S. military
and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Since the beginning of the War on Drugs in the 1970s, the United States and its partners have sunk
vast sums into detecting, interdicting, and deterring drug smuggling. But, as rapper Rick Ross
observed, drug smugglers consider “being dead broke [as] the root of all evil.” The mind-boggling
sums of money available to those who can supply product to the hemisphere’s biggest drug market
is more than enough to convince drug lords and their agents to risk imprisonment, injury, and
death. How much money? By 2009 estimates (the latest available), Mexican and Colombian cartels
rake in $39 billion in wholesale drug profits annually. Depending on where you live in the U.S., a
kilo of cocaine sells for between $34,000 to $120,000. The risks are great, but so are the potential
rewards.
The primary battlespaces in the drug war are the “plazas,” a set of heavily contested drugtrafficking routes in northern Mexico. Cartels spill blood and cut off heads for control of the plazas,
but the Caribbean trafficking routes are no less important. By utilizing small craft and “narcosubs,” drug smugglers make it more difficult and expensive for the US to interdict them. The narco
navy also heavily exploits capability gaps among American partners that lack American manpower
and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
The most basic surface combatant utilized by the narco navy is the old-fashioned and dependable
go-fast boat. Familiar to viewers of Scarface and Miami Vice, the go-fast boat is typically between
25 and 45 feet in length and mostly travels at night. An typical go-fast boat contains one to two
tons of Colombian cocaine and typically complete a coke run in one day. Go-fast boats are
occasionally augmented by slower craft such as Mexican “panga” boats—small fishing boats used
to transport marijuana from Mexico’s Pacific coast to California.
But the narco navy is hardly limited to surface operations. Drug smugglers have their own silent
service in the narco-subs. So what are narco-subs? These craft range from cheap, self-propelled
semi-submersibles that move product over short distances to submarines with periscopes capable
of traveling from South America to the United States. Narco-submarines have been discovered in
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Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, and other regions of the Americas. They augment the fast-boast force
through their ability to clandestinely transport drugs and evade detection.
Narco-subs, while primitive compared with advanced Western navies, are nothing to be scoffed
at. They have long since evolved from the disposable water coffins utilized in the 1990s to
supersubs that operate out of clandestine pens along the Colombian coastline. One narco-sub
contained up to 10,000 pounds of cocaine and was equipped with global positioning systems.
Another sub was 74 feet long, with twin propellers and a 5-foot conning tower. Of course, not all
narco-subs are sophisticated, as smaller subs capable of transporting lesser loads shorter distances
continue to be employed.
How do the United States and its partners cope with narco-subs and go-fast boats? Some of the
same principles of data fusion, collaboration, and synchronization that Norman Friedman dubbed
“picture-centric warfare” in warfighting come into play when interdicting the narco navy. The
United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has invested in the use of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance tools as well as nontraditional organizations like the Joint
Interagency Task Force South that share information throughout the U.S. government.
The United States has also significantly internationalized the drug war. The U.S., Canadian,
Central American, and European joint anti-illicit trafficking campaign Operation Martillo is one
of SOUTHCOM’s key tools for combating drug smuggling. With 14 countries participating,
Martillo netted 119 metric tons of cocaine with a wholesale value of $2.35 billion. Because of the
problem’s sheer scale, decisive operations against drug traffickers are only possible with
international cooperation.
Martillo, however, is only one segment in a larger American set of regional security initiatives in
the Americas. In Mexico, cooperation against drug cartels occurs under the framework of the
Merida Initiative. Extensive American civilian and military assistance has also resumed in a
Central America increasingly buffeted by fierce drug-related crime and violence. Just as naval
operations ultimately are aimed at influencing events on land, the U.S. contest with the narco navy
augments and supports land-based operations.
As long as drugs are profitable, traffickers will invest in more elaborate ways to evade the military
and law enforcement. The presence of submarines themselves are operational responses to the
tightening of the net around the Caribbean. This does not mean, however, that the United States
and allies cannot raise the cost of operating with sophisticated ISR systems, intelligence-sharing,
and collaborative and flexible organizations that ensure the right people have the information
necessary for detection and interdiction. What it does mean is that drugs will continue to be
smuggled—overland and at sea—by truck and by submarine.
http://news.usni.org/2012/06/15/rise-narco-navy
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SECTION 3:
THE EVOLUTION OF ‘NARCO-SUBMARINES’ ENGINEERING
Byron Ramirez
Small Wars Journal
Originally published 27 February 2014
Updated for this paper 18 May 2014
Who: Colombian drug cartels.
What: The deployment of ‘narco-sub’ vessels which include submarines, semi-submersible
(SPSSs) vessels, narco-torpedoes, and low profile vessels (LPVs) in Colombia as a tactical
countermeasure to the increased effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and military services
in detecting and seizing planes and go-fast boats. These vessels provide a new means for
transporting and delivering narcotics to their intended destinations while lowering the risk of
detection and interdiction.
When: Indications traced back to at least 1993 near the San Andres Islands, Colombia. In that
interdiction, the captured semi-submersible vessel was about 7 meters long and had the capacity
to carry up to 2 tons of narcotics. By the mid-2000s, there had been a significant increase in the
number of semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels and low profile vessels (LPVs) found and seized by
Colombian and U.S. authorities. The design of the confiscated vessels reflects an evolutionary
engineering process.
Where: Most recently, the vessels are being manufactured near Colombia’s Pacific coastline.
Smugglers carry building materials, including heavy equipment like propulsion gear and
generators into jungles and then assemble the vessels under jungle canopies. Once completed, the
vessels are moved through mangroves via muddy rivers that empty into the Pacific Ocean. Once
there, the vessels travel northward towards Central America and Mexico where they will transport
and deliver narcotics.
Why: Due to the increased collaborative efforts of law enforcement agencies and militaries as
well as their increased tracking and policing technologies which enabled them to detect drug planes
and go-fast boats with greater effectiveness, smugglers developed ‘narco-subs’ as an innovative,
alternate counter-measure for delivering their narcotics. These vessels have been custom-built by
drug traffickers to smuggle their narcotics in an effort to reduce the risk of detection and seizure.
Evolution: When examining the various vessels seized to date, we can observe an evolution in
the engineering used in these ‘narco-sub’ vessels. The first vessel confiscated (1993) was truly a
rough initial experimental model, built out of fiberglass and wood. The San Andres semisubmersible as it came to be known was able to control its running depth and direction. However,
this vessel was not able to fully submerge. Hence, it was visible from the air. Moreover, its speed
was relatively low, estimated to be less than 10 mph. These attributes converged to make its
detection highly possible.
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During the years that followed, perhaps until near the end of 2004, the ‘narco-sub’ vessels went
through an experimentation phase during which cartels attempted to improve design and
performance capabilities through trial and error. It is during this phase that we can find the 1994
Tayrona model and the 1995 Cartagena model. Both of these vessels were submersibles capable
of self-propulsion and full submersion. Even though their engineering was relatively rudimentary,
these vessels were still capable of travelling longer distances while carrying larger loads of
narcotics. Hence, their improved design allowed them to travel slightly faster and submerge underwater, while having an increased carrying capacity. It is also during this experimentation phase
that some drug smugglers contracted Russian engineers to help develop a better narco-submarine
(see Facatativa submarine).
Interestingly, between 2005 and 2006, authorities seized an increased number of similarly
designed vessels which seems to indicate rapid consistent construction which in turn appears to
signal a rapid prototyping phase taking place. Since most of the seized vessels during this time
period seem to exhibit similar design characteristics, it is possible to conceive that drug traffickers
may have streamlined their scope of designs and focused on building certain models. After all,
most of the seized vessels during this period seem to resemble go fast-boats (similar hull form)
that were reconfigured so that their profile is lower and hence they are less visible. However,
during the narco-submarine prototyping phase, drug traffickers continued to experiment with
numerous variations. This includes all sorts of methods to mask the heat signature (using
underwater heat exchangers) and even cathodic protection. It is believed that this may have been
necessary because they used discarded fiberglass molds to make the hulls of both Go-Fast boats
and SPSSs. In terms of how they accessed discarded molds, when legitimate boat manufactures
claim to have destroyed their molds after they were used, one can only guess. It is also during this
phase that we see the emergence of low profile vessels (LPVs). The vessels captured during 2005
and 2006 seem to fall under the category of LPVs. These vessels had greater stealth, better
operational performance, and increased speed and size.
It is difficult to determine whether at some point drug cartels decided to focus mainly on building
LPVs instead of submarines and that is perhaps the reason for the increased number of LPVs that
were detected. Nonetheless, it is most likely that drug smugglers have employed a mixed strategy
of using both LPVs and submarines concurrently and the LPVs may have been less effective in
avoiding detection, thus explaining why they may have been captured in greater numbers.
Beginning in 2007, authorities witnessed more advanced capabilities in narco-vessels, along with
more effective designs that seem to have become increasingly standardized. In essence, this is a
phase of standardization and design maturity. Narco vessels seized after 2007 were faster, more
stealthy, and capable of carrying bigger loads of drugs than earlier models. During this period, a
narco-sub was capable of reaching speeds of 11 miles per hour while carrying up to 10 tons of
narcotics worth around $200 million USD wholesale. Moreover, some of these newer models are
powered by a 300 / 350 horse-powered diesel engine. They also carry large fuel tanks which allow
them to travel a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 km). Because the majority of their structure is made
out of fiberglass material and they travel nearly below the sea surface, these vessels are almost
impossible to detect via sonar or radar. Colombian narco-traffickers are effective at diversifying
their risk by never solely relying on a single method of transport. During the standardization
phase they continued to employ ‘go-fast’ boats and fishing boats and also began using ‘go-
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slows’. Rather than deploying one ‘go-fast’ carrying 2000 kg, they instead used 10 smaller ‘goslows’, single engine boats each carrying 200 kg which remained in Colombian, Panamanian, and
other territorial waters.
In recent years, ‘narco-sub’ vessels (mostly LPVs) have been built with upper lead shielding which
helps to minimize their heat signature and hence they can evade infrared sensors. Some of the
newer models have piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the ship
moves, making it even less susceptible to infrared detection. This suggests that enforcement
agencies face great challenges in finding them, and thus, must detect them from the air, while
realizing that they yield almost no wake and that their color scheme is usually adapted to where
the boat is designed to operate from; hence, a boat from the southern Pacific coast of Colombia
would be a different shade than one operating near the border with Panama or in the
Caribbean. Lastly, ‘narco-sub’ vessels also possess ballast tanks to alter the vessel’s buoyancy and
are equipped with a satellite global positioning system that aids navigation.
Evolutionary chart:
1970s through
early 1990s

Go-fast boats

Early 1990s
through 2004

‘Narco-sub’ Experimentation Phase

Fiberglass material. Deep “V” offshore
racing hull - usually 30 to 50 feet (10 to 15
m) long, narrow in beam, and equipped with
two or more powerful engines, often with
more than 1000 combined horsepower. The
boats can typically travel at speeds over 80
knots (150 km/h) in calm waters, over 50
knots (90 km/h) in choppy waters, and
maintain 25 knots (47 km/h) in the average
five to seven foot (1.5 to 2 m).

Fiberglass and wood; low horse power
engines; Many different designs used;
Limited in range and capacity.

2005 - 2006

‘Narco-sub’ Prototyping Phase
Similar vessels seized; Increased horsepowered engines; increased capabilities such
as greater stealth, better operational
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performance, and increased speed and size;
Introduction of low-profile vessels (LPVs).

2007 - present

‘Narco-sub’ Standardization and
Maturity Phase
Faster (up to 11 mph); Some made from steel;
Capable of carrying bigger loads of drugs than
earlier models; Two-diesel engines; Engines
up to 350 hp; Upper lead shielding; Advanced
navigation systems; GPS; Anti-radar features;
water-cooled mufflers.
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SECTION 4:
NARCO-SUBMARINES: APPLYING ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO
DRUG SMUGGLING
Byron Ramirez
Small Wars Journal
Originally published 8 March 2014
Updated for this paper 18 May 2014

Over the last few decades, drug smuggling from Latin America to the US has become a highly
lucrative business. Despite the efforts of several national and international law enforcement
agencies to seize drugs, arrest smugglers, disrupt the operational capabilities of cartels, and
diminish the flow of illicit drugs, drug smuggling continues. International law enforcement
agencies and militaries have increasingly collaborated and their efforts have yielded numerous
littoral and ocean seizures and arrests. Nonetheless, drug smuggling activities in the Western
hemisphere persist.
In the early 1990s, as radar and communication technology held by militaries and law enforcement
agencies improved, small planes and go-fast boats belonging to the Colombian cartels became
more easily detectable. As a result of the increased pressure from governments and policing
authorities, drug smugglers had to design countermeasures and develop innovative ways to
transport and deliver their drugs.
This essay focuses on a set of highly advanced technological inventions used for transporting and
delivering narcotics: narco submarines, semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels, low profile vessels
(LPVs), and narco-torpedoes. Narco-submarines (name generally assigned to these types of
vessels) are indeed innovative logistical tools that allow smugglers to reduce the risk of detection
and capture. From a cost-benefit analysis perspective, smugglers truly reap high ‘net benefits’ as
the benefits certainly surpass the costs. From an economic standpoint, the amount returned is a
high multiplier of the amount invested. And from a strategic viewpoint, drug smugglers through
their narco submarines are able to effectively counteract militaries’ and agencies’ surveillance
moves. Hence, drug smugglers have both economic and strategic incentives to invest in narco
submarine technologies.
In the early 1990s, Colombia’s Medellin Cartel began to consider ‘narco-subs’ as covert and
innovative method for distributing its products. Because the Colombian drug cartels at that time
were vertically integrated— they controlled the various steps in the product value chain (coca
cultivation, manufacturing, distribution, etc.,)—they well understood the economic value of being
able to efficiently control the delivery of narcotics to their destination while lowering the risk of
detection, interception, and apprehension.
As a result, Colombian drug cartels began to allocate economic resources and invest in producing
narco-submarines as an alternate distribution method. Actual Russian naval engineers were
contracted by the cartels to assist in narco-submarines’ design and construction. The apparent goal
of drug smugglers was to develop a vessel that would be self-propelled, radar-dodging, stealthy,
and capable of travelling long distances.
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After the Medellin Cartel’s collapse in the early 1990s and subsequently the arrests of the Cali
Cartel leaders, remaining lieutenants and their respective emerging drug smuggling organizations
continued to make investments in narco-submarine technologies.
Narco-Subs
The first so-called ‘narco submarine’ was detected in 1993 near the San Andres Islands in
Colombia. However, it was not a fully-submersible vessel. Rather, the San Andres Narco-Sub
was a semi-submersible not capable of diving fully under water. Most of the surface vessel glided
under water while the cockpit and exhaust tubes remained above water. It was about 7 meters long
and had a carrying capacity of up to 2 tons and a crew of 2. This vessel was constructed out of
fiberglass and wood. Later, early narco-subs that were produced include the following:
• The Tayrona Narco-Sub: In 1994, another vessel, named the Tayrona submarine was
seized near Santa Marta, Colombia. This vessel was less than 10 meters long. It was made
of wood and fiberglass and was fit for shallow submergence only with depth controlled by
lead weights externally mounted on the lower hull.
It also possessed advanced
communication and navigation equipment. This first manned submersible was perhaps
towed behind another vessel (or so it is believed by COLNAV Intel). COLNAV naval
engineers and architects estimate that this submarine only had a range of about 200
nm. COLNAV Intelligence suggests that the tactic employed with this sub was to tow it
and release it when sighted by a Navy/Coast Guard vessel, or once it was near its
destination.
• The Cartagena Narco-Sub: A year later, Colombian authorities captured an unfinished
vessel in Cartagena, Colombia. This vessel, the Cartagena submarine, had a cylindrical
steel hull which hints the intention of operating it at greater depths relative to the fiberglass
vessels previously confiscated. When this vessel was found there were no ballast tanks nor
the water inlets/outlets associated with them, which suggests that lead weights were to be
employed similarly as with the 1994 Tayrona model. The 1995 Cartagena submarine was
about 11 meters long, 2 meters wide, and had a carrying capacity of about 1.5 tons.
As the years transpired, the narco-sub technology seems to have improved. As with any
technology, iteration was probably necessary and results were not immediately evident.
• The Facatativa Narco-Sub: In September 2000, law enforcement agencies in Colombia
found a Russian-designed narco-sub in the town of Facatativa, near Bogotá. This vessel
was longer and wider than previous models and had a more elaborate cylindrical, stealthy
design. When the vessel was found it was still under construction. Its estimated
construction cost is 10 million USD. The Facatativa submarine was 30 meters long and
3.5 meters wide. This vessel was indeed intended to be a submarine, capable of full
submersion. It was to be ‘double hulled’ with a single shrouded screw. It is estimated that
it could have carried a crew of up to12 persons. Had this submarine been completed, the
double-hulled vessel may have been able to travel long distances 2,000 nautical miles
(3,700 km), dived 330 feet (100 meters) and carried 150-200 tons of cocaine or heroin.
The Facatativa vessel is significant as it had a large carrying capacity (storage space), and
would have been able to travel long distances and dive to depths that would have made its
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detection highly challenging. The Facatativa model would likely have had depth sonar,
satellite communication, GPS, and navigation radar.
• The Vigo Narco-Sub: Spanish Police in 2006 captured a vessel on the Atlantic coast
which they called the Vigo vessel. It is believed that this submarine was constructed in
Spain and was not closely related to the Colombian subs in design terms. The vessel was
11 meters long, 3 meters wide, and made from steel with ballast tanks on the flanks. A
design feature worth noting is the use of separate props for the diesel (main) and electric
drive. This vessel was likely intended to travel short distances between a cargo ship and
shore to bring illicit drugs into Spain for distribution.
• A Kevlar Coated Narco-Sub: In July 2010, Colombian and Ecuadorian authorities with
the assistance of the United States found and seized a submarine a few miles south of the
border between Colombia and Ecuador. This was a noteworthy find as this was a 30 meter
long, 3 meter wide, large fiberglass submarine with diesel-electric drive and twin screws.
The Kevlar coated submarine was designed for underwater operation while it could also
operate in shallow submergence. The pilot windows located at the base of the sail seem
very similar to the cockpits of other low-profile vessels.
• The Timbiqui Narco-Sub: In February 2011, Colombian authorities assisted by the DEA
(Drug Enforcement Administration) seized a 100 foot long (30 meters) submarine in
Timbiqui, Cauca, Colombia. The submarine lied half-submerged in a mangrove swamp.
The vessel was a fully submersible made out of fiberglass. It could carry a crew of 4 and
dive down to 30 feet (9 meters) below the surface. The submarine had the capacity to
transport 8 tons of narcotics worth close to $150 million to $200 million USD. The
estimated cost of building this submarine is around $2 million USD. The vessel’s design,
two diesel engines, and sophisticated navigational equipment would have allowed it to
travel long distances (up to 2,000 miles) at a speed of up to 11 miles per hour.
Low Profile Vessels (LPVs)
Since early 2006 there were an increased number of seized narco vessels, namely low profile
vessels (LPVs). Improved detection and surveillance technology allowed authorities in Colombia
and the United States to more easily detect, intercept, and seize drug carrying vessels. Authorities
then realized that drug smugglers countered accordingly and produced increasingly sophisticated
vessels, which include features such as modern electronics, navigation systems, anti-radar features,
and water-cooled mufflers, all of which make detection more difficult.
The first low profile vessels (LPVs) boats resembled sealed ‘go-faster’ boats which simply rode
lower in the water. The usual arrangement of these vessels had a cabin at the rear and cargo hold
amidships. However, over time the LPVs’ configuration has been modified resulting in a
specialized hull form with generally pointed bow and stern, with small cabin amidships, an engine
compartment located in the rear of the vessel, and narcotics cargo placed in every available space.
Moreover, sloping sides to the cabin suggest radar stealth. Overall, the vessels’ stealthiness derives
from being built largely out of fiberglass and being low in the water.
In more recent model adaptations, LPVs included the capability to trim running depth via
hydroplanes at rear, a much lower profile than most low-profile boats with the nose completely
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submerged even in calm seas, and metal construction instead of fiberglass. Some examples of
LPVs include the 2006 Pital model and the 2007 Guajira model.
• The 2006 Pital LPV was seized on the River Timbo near Buenaventura, Colombia. It
was 18 meters long and almost 4 meters wide. It could carry 4 tons. The 2006 Pital
model is unique for its twin engine and twin prop arrangement.
• The 2007 Guajira LPV seized 10 miles off Colombia’s Atlantic coast (near the Guajira
Department) was 20 meters long and 3 meters wide. It had the capacity to carry 10 tons.
The rounded cross-section of this LPV provides much larger internal volume and load
capability than most other low-profile boats previously constructed. The mechanical design
of this vessel is also of a twin engine with twin props, twin screw and had large fuel tanks.
COLNAV estimated that this vessel had a range of 3500 nm. This was the first instance of
a LPV captured on the Caribbean coast. The range of this particular vessel yields some
inquiries. Why would Colombian drug traffickers need that type of range? Are Colombian
DTOs perhaps displeased with the cut that the Mexican DTO receive and are consequently
developing narco submarines that will allow them to bypass Mexico altogether? Or
perhaps are they concerned about US efforts at the southern border so they may be
producing submarines with longer range capacity in case the U.S. makes some
breakthrough in security.
Narco-Torpedoes
In August 2005, U.S. authorities seized an unmanned semi-submersible in the Pacific Ocean. This
caught the attention of militaries and law enforcement authorities as they realized that some vessels
were being built in the form of torpedoes, filled with narcotics, and towed underwater by another
boat. These were towed behind a vessel, usually a fishing boat. These probably pre-date the first
submarine attempts. The ‘narco torpedo’ essentially travels at a depth of about 20 to 30 meters.
The torpedo is released if the authorities approach, and discharges beacons after a set period of
time to allow recovery by a back-up boat after the authorities have left the area. The ‘narcotorpedo’ vessel represents a tactical variation in transporting narcotics. Narco-torpedoes are
designed to be difficult to detect and are cheaper to build than semi-submersibles.
Conclusion
During the past 20 years, drug smugglers have experimented with the design and construction of
submarines, semi-submersible (SPSSs) vessels, low profile vessels (LPVs), and narco-torpedoes.
The vessels that have been seized to date reflect technological innovation as well as a commitment
towards continuously improving the vessels’ design and operational capabilities. Drug smugglers
have effectively employed technology as means to their specific ends. It is evident that during the
last two decades drug smugglers have invested on advancing their ‘narco-sub’ technologies. There
is a clear economic payoff in doing so; the cost of building one of these vessels is low relative to
the immense levels of profit they produce, while their design and engineering help to reduce the
overall risk of detection. It is not known how many of these narco-sub vessels are currently under
construction and in operation. However, we can be certain that in spite of increased efforts on the
part of militaries and law enforcement authorities to detect, intercept, and disrupt narcotics

36

distribution, drug smugglers will certainly continue to search for effective ways of transporting
and delivering their product.
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SECTION 5:
TRAJECTORIES, CONTINUITIES AND DISPLACEMENTS IN THE
BIOGRAPHY OF ‘NARCO-SUBS’: FROM THE CARIBBEAN TO THE
PACIFIC 1993-2013.
Javier Guerrero Castro
Written 23 April 2014

Drug Smuggling Organizations (DSOs) have used different approaches to submarine smuggling;
each of those methods creates new challenges for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Some of
those strategies employed include: divers carrying drugs to the sea boxes of ships or, cylindrical
tubes (fiberglass or steel) firmly tied to the keel of small vessels and the popular method known as
‘narcosubs’. Narco-subs is a definition that encompasses different semi-submersible and
submersible artifacts used by (DSOs) to transport illicit drugs to different destinations along the
Caribbean Sea or Pacific Coast of Central America.
Narco-subs can be classified into two main categories: Semi-submersible artifacts and submersible
artifacts. The first category, accounts for most of the narco-subs, while events of the second
categories are scarce. The main difference between the two categories is their immersion capacity.
A semi-submersible can submerge up to three quarters of its structure while a submersible achieves
full immersion of its hull. Within the latter category, we have both manned and unmanned devices.
The most common of the unmanned artifacts are also known as ‘Torpedoes’ or ‘narco-torpedoes’
that are cylindrical steel tubes with stabilizing fins (Fig 1.) and which are usually towed by fishing
boats.

Fig.1
Despite the important role of innovation developed by the DSOs in order to carry their activities,
these processes have been scarcely studied. Two broad interpretations of the phenomenon can be
found. The first often found in the media focuses on the ‘technological achievements’ of DSOs
accompanied with a sense of wonder for such. The second is centered on the idea of ‘catching up’.
This second interpretation only takes into account the flexibility and technological innovation
capacities of DSOs and can be summarized in the idea that Drug Smugglers are always ‘one step
ahead’ of LEAs.
In the case of Drug Smuggling Technologies, we are in need of studies that go beyond the two
mentioned approaches. We must also understand the technological choices of those involved in
the War on Drugs (WoD) along with related full implications and complexity. As Dolnik (2007,
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p. 16) affirms “it is impossible to understand fully the tactical and technological choices of a group
without understanding the historical, emotional and expressive meaning of a particular weapon or
tactic to a given group.” When we understand that the adaptation of a particular technology
necessarily involves transformations within the group that adopts it, we then will be able to explain
other changes, including organizational ones. Also, it is necessary in order to achieve a
comprehensive understanding of the evolution of a technology to analyze the coupling of
technology design as well as its implementation and use (Pollock & Williams, 2008).
New technologies are seldom developed from scratch, but are the result of a process of gradual
change and/or a combination of existing technologies (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999, p. 9). And
what is more important to any study of drug smuggling innovation is that the process of
technological choice is also based on economic decisions (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999, p. 12).
In order to understand the process of technological innovation within the WoD we need to take
into account the structural aspects of the environment of technologies (Rip & Kemp, 1998),
emphasize the importance of local expertise and experience, in the form of tacit, experience based
and local knowledge for the building of successful technological artifacts (Williams, 1997), as well
as use a more symmetrical analysis that involves not only DSOs but LEAs innovation in a process
of co-evolution of technology.
If we wish to analyze the process of technological innovation leading to the design, building and
use of ‘narco-subs’, we could start off by identifying some key aspects of the historical
development of the ‘narco-subs’ while highlighting the different approaches that the concept and
development of the artifact in both the Caribbean and the Pacific has had. At the same time, it is
worth highlighting the main changes regarding maritime interdiction developed by Colombian
LEAs, specially the Colombian Navy.
A common thread in the accounts of the development of narco-subs is the idea of a logical
progression, both from other forms of smuggling narcotics and in the move from semi-subs to fully
submersible artifacts (e.g. Kraul, 2007; Lagan, 2010; Mackey, 2010), and as a history of
continuous technological improvement (e.g. Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, 2010; Watkins,
2011). A closer analysis of the data reveals a far more complex story, in which different artifacts
have been designed, built and used not following a logical progression but exploring different
overlapping alternatives. What is found is a diversity of submersible and semi-submersible
artifacts, which can be initially analyzed as the result of ‘micro-innovations’ in some cases, and of
radical solutions in others.
As with other illicit related topics, to reconstruct the full history of the narco-subs is a difficult
task. Nevertheless, there are some data available that allows us to approach the phenomenon. Even
though this approach can be criticized for taking into account only “unsuccessful criminals”, the
opposite view is to assume that LEAs are essentially efficient. The most recent data through 2013
indicates that 82 ‘narco-subs’ (Fig. 2) and 98.2 tons of cocaine have been seized, as well as 22
craft shipyards 1. This number encompasses semi-submersible, submersible, manned and
unmanned artifacts. But we currently lack, and probably will always, the numbers of those narco-

1

Source: Armada República de Colombia. Estadísticas 2013. Bogotá D.C. Colombia. Dirección de Operaciones
Navales.

39

subs that sank. Most of the ‘narco-subs’ have been found in the pacific, approximately 78% (64
artifacts), while 20% of them in the Caribbean 2.
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Fig. 2 - Number of narco-subs seized.
The analysis of the data allows us to see the history of ‘narco-subs’ as being divided into three
periods: 1.) First attempts, 1993-2000, 2.) Development and consolidation of semisubmersible
artifacts, 2001-2009 and; 3.) Current moment, 2010-Present. Each of these periods shows different
trajectories in design and building of narco-subs, and maybe one of the aspects that could provide
explanations for this are the structural aspects of the environment 3.
While the first period in the history of ‘narco-subs’ dates back to 1993 in the Caribbean,
specifically near the Island of San Andres, it could have started a couple of years earlier. Two
different trajectories are found within this period, the first with ‘Laura’ the narco-sub found in San
Andres, and the one found in Barranquilla in 1994. With the first approach, there are changes in
the hull of the boats, consisting mainly in covering it with fiberglass, turning them into semisubmersible artifacts. The second approach in the early history of narco-subs, is that builders
started with, as a navy captain said, trying to make something really complex, that is to say, to
build submarines, or at least fully submersible artifacts. There are two prototypes representative
of this trajectory, first the ‘Tayrona’ (Fig. 3) and second, the ‘Cartagena’ (Fig. 4).

2
3

The ‘Facatativa’ a narco sub discovered in a town near Bogotá accounts for the missing percentage.
Not just as geography but as the interaction between LEAs and DSOs in the complex environment of the War on
Drugs. Nevertheless it is important to mention the importance of taking into account the difference in geography,
and tidal regimes are important in the way that drug smugglers act and interdiction takes place as well.
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Fig. 3 - The Tayrona

Fig. 4 - The Cartagena
According to naval sources of the time, while different in their design, both the ‘Tayrona’ and the
‘Cartagena’ submarines had formal naval engineering behind them, and both possessed
hydrodynamic designs based on blueprints. The Tayrona was said to be able to submerge up to 10
meters below the surface, it also had a sail and ballast tanks and was powered by a truck diesel
engine that was adapted to the vessel. The ‘Cartagena’ was said to be able to submerge up to 20mt 4.
The building of these artifacts was apparently done in workshops in urban areas, and once finished;
they were transported to the shores by truck. The materials mainly used were steel and fiberglass.
It is important to mention two important developments of LEAs during the middle of the nineties.
The first corresponds to the development of the Colombian Navy Coast Guard, and the second the
signing of a long term agreement between Colombia and the United States regarding maritime
interdiction.

4

http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-387160
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While the Colombian Navy Coast Guard was officially created in 1979, it was not until 1994 when
the first boats were purchased. The ‘Dolphins’ as they are known, are small and slow boats,
nevertheless they provided the Colombian Coast Guard with the opportunity to acquire knowledge
regarding interdiction and procurement of technology. In 1998, the Colombian Coast Guard
acquired the capacity to control to some extent, one among the principal interdiction tools used
during the nineties, the go-fast boats. LEAs were then able to procure faster boats as well as benefit
from the deployment of Coast Guard stations and Radar Systems 5. The signing and
implementation of the agreement between the governments of the United States of America and
of Colombia to suppress illicit traffic by sea, entered into force on February 20, 1997, allowing
complementing capabilities and efforts regarding interdiction.
The second period can be broadly dated between the years 2000 and 2009. During this period, the
threat of narco-subs turned from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean. During this period, it is
possible to discern a process of micro innovations from boats to semi-submersible artifacts, but
also a more radical approach, the building of hulls from scratch. Within the first trajectory of
micro-innovation we can account for the enhancement of cargo capacities and hidden
compartments, followed by the covering of the hull with fiberglass (Fig. 5). Nevertheless, this left
builders with the unsolved problem of the trail and heat signature of the vessels. These problems
faced by traffickers were actually used by LEAs to seize vessels using visual inspections and
infrared technologies. Builders tried to solve the heating problem by covering the engines and
putting them inside. Finally, builders opted to cover the entire hull with fiberglass, placing a hatch
and trying different approaches for the exhausts, Fig. 6 is an example.

Fig. 5

5

There are interesting turns, learning and setbacks in the process of technological and organizational innovation
within the Coast Guard.
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Fig. 6
The second trajectory consisted of building semi-submersible artifacts from scratch. The usual
path begins with the building of the structure, which is made from wood, then a mixture of resins,
catalyst and solvents is spread onto the wood structure until a waterproof, insulating, lightweight
and durable layer is formed. After this stage, electrical wiring and engines are assembled. Unlike
the design mentioned in the previous paragraph, this semi-submersible used a diesel engine.
Different models of this trajectory introduced micro-innovations; hydrodynamic designs were also
introduced which helped to improve autonomy, resistance and fuel consumption. Also, the trail
problem was resolved by using different hydrodynamic solutions until the trail was reduced to a
minimum. Also, different approaches to the exhaust were used (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8). Finally,
fiberglass and wood are adopted as main building materials.

Fig. 7
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Fig. 8
Similarities between artifacts allows us to confirm that semi-submersible artifacts found in the
Caribbean (Uraba and La Guajira) during these years were the result of the same groups of ‘narcosubs’ builders that built subs that operated in the Pacific 6. However, there is a clear difference from
the early years of narco-subs construction. The artifacts built from 2005 on were built in artisanal
workshops in the middle of the jungle, but near the sea, using hard to access places, with thick
vegetation around (usually in mangrove areas), near estuaries and kept in maximum secrecy during
the building of the artifacts.
It is also important to note that during this period, the Colombian navy developed skills in
detecting, monitoring, interdicting and capturing these artifacts using both previous strategies used
in capturing go-fast boats as well as developing new ones (Rodriguez Viera, 2013).
During the third period, we can appreciate two trajectories, one of displacement and one of
uncertainty. The two trajectories are: (1) the search for a fully submersible manned artefact, and
(2) the use of different approaches to unmanned submersible artifacts. The displacement of
knowledge (possibly embodied in builders that are capable of avoiding capture) to the Caribbean,
as five 'narco-subs' were interdicted between 2011 and 2012.
The first trajectory is exemplified in two artifacts, one seized in July 2010 in Ecuador, and the
second one seized in February 2011. The main characteristics of these vessels are their immersion
capacity, and the introduction of new materials such as Kevlar in the building of this new
‘generation’ of ‘narco-subs’. One important aspect is that the knowledge required for building
these artifacts is claimed to be expert knowledge. This knowledge is difficult to pass on and
therefore such a trajectory is hard to follow. The second trajectory of submersible artifacts is
represented in the artifacts known as narco-torpedoes and the return to tubes fixed to hulls of cargo
ships.
Finally, uncertainty is hard to avoid. Are narco-subs sailing in the Pacific or in the Caribbean? The
U.S Drug Enforcement Administration has considered that only about 20% of these artifacts are
intercepted. There are others, who are not as pessimistic and prefer a medium estimate. Let us
remember that no method has disappeared.

6

The author was able to collect data regarding the building of the semisubmersible found in La Guajira in 1997,
which was still in construction. The people of the area assert that builder came from the Pacific; they were easily
recognizable because they were ‘morenos’ (African American) in a zone inhabited by aborigines.
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Final Thoughts
It is clear that the process of learning within the WoD for both DSOs and LEAs is both a process
of “learning by trying’, making improvements and modifications to different components as to
make them work, and ‘learning by using’, making improvements in the artefact or systems of
artifacts implemented (Fleck, 1994, p. 638).
After analyzing the 20 years of narco-subs we can see some interesting patterns, (1) the move from
the Caribbean to the Pacific, (2) the move from complex submarine artifacts with formal
knowledge involved (Caribbean) to more local knowledge developments, involving work with
fiberglass easily found among fishing communities in the Pacific coast who also travel to the
Caribbean, and (3) the search for building complex submarine artifacts.
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POSTCRIPT
Captain Mark F. Morris, USN
May 2014
When I arrived in Colombia in early 2006, the main method of transport for the narco-traffickers in
the Caribbean was still the “Go-Fast,” a high-speed, open cockpit (and usually hand-made) boat with
four or five outboard motors carrying 1,000 to 2,000 kilograms of cocaine. In the Pacific, it was a
registered, flagged fishing vessel carrying from 4,000 to 10,000 kilograms (first using the Colombian
and later the Ecuadorian flags). On both coast these vessels would leave Colombia for somewhere
in Central America to discharge their cargo for land transport to and across our southern frontier.
But something was very worrying to Colombian Navy Admirals; they repeatedly told me that their
Naval Intelligence kept hearing rumors of submersibles or submarines. They had seen the
rudimentary submersibles in the early 1990s and two they had captured were on display at the
Cartagena Naval Base. These were most probably vessels that were towed behind a mother-ship and
only released when the mother-ship had been detected by some type of maritime patrol or near their
final destination. They had also seen in the Pacific and captured towed-behind torpedoes (the
Colombian Navy used the term “artifact” rather than torpedo) designed to carry cocaine. When the
mother-ship was detected, the towline was released and the torpedo would remain below the surface
for several hours and then rise to be reacquired by the towing vessel to continue on their journey.
Most amazing was the true submarine found under construction in an industrial area of Bogota in
2000; not only amazing due to its double hull and complex ballasting system but also because Bogota
is over 350 miles from the nearest coast and is high in the Andes at over 8,000 feet above sea level.
But other than these few examples, the narco-trafficking submersibles only existed in these
maddening rumors.
This all changed abruptly in late 2006 when the U.S. Coast Guard captured a Self-Propelled SemiSubmersible (SPSS) off the coast of Costa Rica with about 3,000 kg of Colombian cocaine. After
that, SPSSs seemed to be everywhere. In the most technical sense, an SPSS is not a submarine, but
rather a Low Profile or Low Observable Vessel, but by most accounts the narco-traffickers
themselves referred to them as “submarines” (while the crews referred to them as “coffins”). As
more and more were captured, the Colombian Navy and we in the U.S. Embassy saw increasing
sophistication of capabilities and measures to prevent detection. These included various paint
schemes to camouflage the vessel in the water. Below the waterline heat exchangers as well as
venting the diesel engine exhaust below the waterline to reduce the heat signature emitted by the
vessel. Hammering a thin layer of lead between the wooden deck and fiberglass to reduce the radar
reflectivity of the vessel (or so we thought was the idea). One vessel was even fitted with cathodic
protection in the form of zinc blocks which means to someone familiar with sea-going vessels that
this vessel was designed for long-term usage not the one-way trip of almost all narco-trafficking
vessels. The idea that the SPSS was only a Pacific coast method of transport was ended with the
discovery of a large, nearly complete vessel on the Guajira Peninsula in 2008. Even to this day,
some Colombian Naval Officers refer to this vessel as “The Beast” due to its large size. It was almost
70 feet long, had a very wide beam with twin engines and twin propellers; analysis by Colombian

46

Navy naval engineers and naval architects indicated that it had an unrefueled range of over 2,500
nautical miles and an 8 ton cargo capacity. Yet the rumors of true submarines remained.
If 2007 and 2008 were the years of the semi-submersible, and while the SPSS did not disappear as a
method of transport (just as the Go-Fast had not during this time), 2009 became the year of the small
boat. Instead of a “Go-Fast” with 2,000 kilos of cocaine, the drug trafficking organizations sent
hundreds of small, single-engine boats called “pangas,” each with 100 to 200 kg of cocaine built into
the hull and framework of boat. These boats hugged the coastline remaining in territorial waters of
the littoral states thereby avoiding U.S. and Allied naval forces stopping them. While the local Coast
Guards or Maritime Police Forces may be able to stop one or two, the vast majority of them sailed
past unmolested. I used the American Football term “Flooding the Zone” as way to describe this
within the Embassy and later to the Colombian Admiralty. And yet, in spite of all the success of this
method, the rumors of true submarines persisted.
A few days before my transfer from Colombia in 2010, the Colombian Naval Intelligence’s rumor
of a true submarine was confirmed as fact by the capture of the first of two. The first was found in
Ecuador only a few miles south of their border with Colombia and a few months later, the second
was in Colombia many miles north of the Ecuadorian border. These submarines, built in jungle
shipyards, showed that they had sophistication necessary for completely submerged operations. And
though designed to run on the surface on diesel propulsion, they had the ability to submerge and run
on battery power for several hours and while underwater would be very difficult to detect.
So, how do we detect, monitor, track, and stop submersibles, semi-submersibles, and, moreover, any
vessel trafficking illicit products? What are the best countermeasures against a narco-trafficking
vessel in general and specifically what are the best countermeasures against the true submersibles?
First and foremost, detecting any vessel on the high seas is difficult at best. With some wind and
waves, it is nearly impossible to see a small boat or the snorkel of a submarine. Now, add in the fact
that designers and operators are working to conceal themselves and their purpose makes the task
only harder. American operations analysis shows that given good intelligence of a drug event and a
patrol box of a certain length and width, a surface vessel operating alone has only a 5% probability
of detecting (PD) that event. A surface vessel with an embarked helicopter increases the PD to 30%,
and by adding a Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the mix, the PD goes up to 70%. Analysis by the
Colombian Navy shows that adding one of their submarines to the mix raises the PD to 90%.
My colleagues in the DEA would say that the whole process always begins with intelligence. This
gives them an indication of what they call a drug trafficking event. From this intelligence they would
ask the proper authorities to move maritime assets into place to monitor the area and detect a suspect
vessel. Once detected, next track the vessel, and then move in the forces necessary to stop, question,
board, and capture suspect vessels (known as the “end game”). Monitoring, detecting, and tracking
is the first part of the problem and the “end game” is the second part of the problem. The final part
of the problem is where the DEA and other law enforcement investigate to determine the origin of
both the cocaine and the vessel transporting it. With respect to the vessel, the goal was to find and
destroy the building facility (usually a jungle boatyard) and more importantly, arrest the illicit
vessels’ designers and builders as a way of reducing the drug trafficking organizations ability to
produce improved vessels in the future.
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Monitoring, detecting, and tracking can be done by surface vessels patrolling but are best done with
properly equipped maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). These are fixed wing aircraft with medium to
long endurance as well as very good radar and electro-optical/infrared-optical (EO/IO) 1 system.
These aircraft should also have systems designed to detect and evaluate radio transmissions and
receivers for the shipboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) 2. MPA are also usually fitted
with some aerial observer windows that allows for both human observation and photography of
suspect vessels. With queuing provided by either naval or law enforcement intelligence, the aircraft
would launch for a patrol over an area where the suspect vessel is thought to be transiting. By flying
planned search patterns, the crew maximizes its chance to detect the suspect vessel by radar, radio
transmission detection, and the EO/IO system. More often than not, the crew’s main job is to
determine a suspect vessel amongst a myriad of other vessels. For a narco-trafficking submarine or
SPSS this would be rather easy but for a panga or drug-carrying commercial fishing vessel this can
be very difficult. This is where a very high resolution EO/IO system is used to monitor the suspect
vessel from outside what is known as the counter-detection range. Surface vessels can also patrol
an area being part of the monitoring, detecting, and tracking phase of the problem. As shown above,
they are limited in their ability to monitor and detect when operating alone (a 5% PD) but when they
have an flight deck and use an embarked helicopter they are six times more effective (a 30% PD).
Again, adding a MPA to the problem makes detection more likely than not (a 70% PD).
Once a suspect vessel is detected and is being tracked, then this vessel needs to be interrogated and
if necessary boarded, searched, the crew arrested, and evidence seized. This can only be done by a
surface vessel with the capability to send a boarding party to another vessel. The interrogation is to
determine if the vessel is a registered (e.g., under the flag of a state) or a stateless vessel. If it is a
registered vessel, then permission of the flagging state is needed before the vessel can be boarded. 3
If the vessel is not registered, or flying a false flag, it can be boarded without further permission.
Once detected, often the crew of a drug carrying vessel will start dumping the illicit cargo overboard
or purposely scuttle or fire their vessel. In this case the job of the boarding party is to first save the
lives of the crew of the trafficking vessel and then if time allows, recover evidence for prosecution.
Since operating an unregistered submersible or semi-submersible is against both U.S. 4 and
Colombian 5 law it is not necessary for the boarding party to risk their lives entering a sinking vessel
in order to seize evidence of illegal drugs.
There are two types of surface vessels best suited for counter-narcotics operations. First is a highspeed pursuit or interceptor boat designed to outrun a “Go-Fast.” One example is the Midnight
Express brand boat provided to the Colombian Coast Guard with Plan Colombia funding and more
purchased later with Colombian Navy funds. This 39 foot long boat, at one time also used by the
US Customs Service, has a top speed of 70 knots. While quite successful in counter-narcotics and

1
2

3
4
5

Some of which are known by the trade name “FLIR”
AIS is a system mandated by the International Maritime Organization on all vessels over 300 gross tons. Some
national authorities, such as Colombia, require it on all vessels engaged in commercial fishing in their EEZ
without regard to size. The system provides the receiving station information about AIS-equipped vessel,
therefore it is thought that it is less like that an AIS equipped vessel would be engaged in illicit activity.
Ships engaged in piracy or slaving but not drug trafficking can are the exception under International Law
See 18 U.S. Code § 2285, known as the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act.
The Colombian law is very similar to U.S. with one notable exception; if the person convicted is a former member
or employee of the Colombian Navy, then the sentence is doubled.
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other Coast Guard-type operations such as search and rescue, they had very little endurance for
patrolling.
The other type of vessel is one suited for patrolling. This could be any sized vessel from the former
U.S. Coast Guard 82 foot Point Class cutters transferred to the Colombians early in Plan Colombia
to Colombia’s frigates with flight decks and an embarked naval helicopter. The former could patrol
for three or four days, the latter for several weeks. The important factor here is the ability to stay at
sea for more than a day and patrol beyond the visual horizon.
Once a vessel of any type is seized and the crew arrested, then law enforcement investigates both the
origin of the cocaine as well as the origin of the vessel. While a hand-made panga or Go-Fast leaves
few clues that can lead to arrests of the designers and builders, the more sophisticated SPSS and
especially the true submersibles, usually leave many more clues. For example, diesel engines have
serial numbers so that previous owners can usually be found. In the case of a submersible and the
pressures of water at even a few feet of depth, one cannot buy piping and values at your average
builder’s warehouse store but rather must order high quality specialty pieces designed to resist
greater pressures. These items have marking that identify things like the manufacturer, date and
place of manufacture, lot number, etc.; things that give law enforcement better ability to track the
item to the buyer.
One specific countermeasure in the case of submersibles is the tracking of potential crew members
and designers. Many of the panga, Go-Fast, and even SPSS crews are recruited from the coast of
Colombia in areas where fishing is common, so there is a large pool of potential recruits with years
of boating experience. But a submarine is different; one cannot recruit a crew from a fishing village
and expect them to successfully operate a submarine without extensive training. One can only recruit
an experienced submarine crew from the very small pool of former navy submariners. Seven South
American navies have submarines and while all the subs in these navies are not the same, all have
German-built Type-209 submarines which could provide a small pool of men who have all trained
and qualified on the same platform. Likewise, the pool of those who could design or supervise the
building of a submarine is very small and are very likely to have prior navy or naval shipyard
experience working on submarines.
A final note about countermeasures; it is important for the maritime forces to remain flexible because
the Drug Trafficking Organizations are always changing their techniques, tactics, and procedures.
In my time in Colombia, while the narco-traffickers would develop new methods – such as the SPSS
– they would continue to use the older, proven methods such as Go-Fasts. We had to be careful in
our assistance to the Colombians to avoid providing single-purpose solutions. My thought was that
if we provided them equipment that could only be used for a single purpose, for example, maybe a
type of sonar to detect and track a semi-submersible, it would have a little use when they shifted
back to fishing boats or sent more loads by Go-Fast. With the limited resources I had under Plan
Colombia, I wanted high quality items that could be used in a variety of situations.
A narco-sub, be it a semi-submersible or true submarine, represents a vast improvement over the
other methods of transporting narcotics and other illicit cargo. They are more difficult to detect and
track than the more traditional methods of transport and generally have greater range and cargo
capacity. But unlike the older methods, both the semi-submersible and submarine represent a threat
to our national security; if they can leave the coast of Colombia with 5 to 10 tons of cocaine and
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transit with little chance of detection, they could also approach our coast undetected with 5 to 10
tons of something more dangerous than drugs.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
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PICTURE GALLERY: NARCO VESSELS
Vessel No. 1
Name: San Andres semi-submersible
Location: San Andres Islands, Caribbean
Date: 1993

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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Vessel No. 2
Name: Tayrona Submarine
Location: Santa Marta, Colombia
Date: 1994

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Javier Guerrero Castro
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Vessel No. 3
Name: Cartagena model
Location: Colombia
Date: Seized 1995

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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http://www.tamariskrtw.com/?attachment_id=1296

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Vessel No. 4
Name: Batboat
Location: Northern Colombia
Date: Seized between 1993 - 1995

http://www.tamariskrtw.com/?attachment_id=1296

Courtesy Javier Guerrero Castro
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Vessel No. 5
Name: Facatativa Submarine (Russian-designed)
Location: Facatativa, Colombia
Date: September 7, 2000

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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http://mafiatoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Cocaine-Submarine.jpg
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Vessel No. 6
Name: Unmanned torpedo
Location: Pacific Ocean
Date: August 18, 2005

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696
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Vessel No. 7
Name: Pital (Low Profile Vessel)
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia
Date: March 2006

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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Vessel No. 8
Name: 50-foot wood and fiberglass craft
Location: Pacific Ocean (near Costa Rica)
Date: November 2006

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15811689/#.UsZt0vRDtxw
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Vessel No. 9
Name: Bigfoot 1(LPV)
Location: Pacific Ocean near Colombia
Date: November 2006

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Vessel No. 10
Name: Low profile vessel – 18 meters long and 3 meters wide
Location: Colombia’s Pacific Coast
Date: July 2007

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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http://www.ryot.org/drug-traffickers-using-submarines-to-move-product/32166
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Vessel No. 11
Name: Low profile vessel (boat)
Location: Colombia
Date: 2007

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater
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Vessel No. 12
Name: Guajira low-profile vessel (boat)
Location: Guajira, Colombia
Date: 2007

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

http://www.documentingreality.com/forum/f242/drugs-submarines-9096/
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http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater
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Vessel No. 13
Name: Narco Torpedo
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia
Date: 2007

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
73

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subssmuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-torpedo_23288_600x450.jpg
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Vessel No. 14
Name: LPV
Location: 75 miles off Colombia’s Pacific coast
Date: December 31, 2007

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater

Vessel’s crew sank the vessel upon encountering authorities.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/the-americas/090408/drug-traffickers-move-underwater

75

Vessel No. 15
Name: Steel LPV
Location: Colombia
Date: February 2008

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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Vessel No. 16
Name: Colombian home-made LPV
Location: Pacific Ocean (near Mexico)
Date: July 2008

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/03/176143/colombias-narco-sub-museum-gives.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7515056.stm
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Vessel No. 17
Name: Bigfoot 2 (LPV)
Location: Pacific Ocean (350 – 400 miles west of Guatemala)
Date: September 2008

http://themaritimeblog.com/us-coast-guard-and-us-navy-interdict-two-semi-submersible-vessels/

http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/military_photos_20080916233911.aspx
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http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26795833/ns/world_news-americas/t/us-military-nets-second-cocaine-subweek/#.UzXPafldVxy

http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html
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Vessel No. 18
Name: Handmade LPV with 1.6 tons of cocaine
Location: Tumaco, Colombia
Date: 2008

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subssmuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-handmade_23285_600x450.jpg
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Vessel No. 19
Name: Narco LPV
Location: 150 miles northwest of the Colombia-Ecuador border
Date: January 2009

Photo: US Navy
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/new-law-harpoon/
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Vessel No. 20
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Self Propelled)
Location: Caribbean Sea
Date: January 2009

http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/sfl-drug-submersible-vessels-busted-off-pacifi002,0,4899141.photo

http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-08-01/news/fl-coast-guard-drug-sub-20110801_1_vessels-firstnarco-caribbean-waters
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Vessel No. 21
Name: Low Profile Vessel
Location: Eastern Pacific off the coast of Central America
Date: October 21, 2009

http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/
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Vessel No. 22
Name: Low Profile Vessel
Location: 500 miles off Colombian Pacific coast
Date: June 2010
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http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124.php

http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/article/Narco-subs-of-cartels-sink-to-new-lows-in1707377.php
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Vessel No. 23
Name: Kevlar-Coated Super-submarine
Location: 5 miles south of Colombia-Ecuador border
Date: July 2, 2010

http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/

http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php
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http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php

http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/advances-in-narco-submarine-technology/?_r=0
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http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html

http://www.chron.com/news/gallery/Narco-subs-caught-on-camera-18124/photo-1251598.php
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http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subssmuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/10/mauner_mahecha_s_drug_submarin
es_inside_a_high_tech_south_american_narco.html
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Vessel No. 23
Name: Kevlar-Coated Super-submarine (Interior of vessel)
Location: 5 miles south of Colombia-Ecuador border
Date: July 2, 2010

http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff drugsub/alV
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff drugsub/all/
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http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/03/ff_drugsub/all/

http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2010/07/drug-subs-2-0/drug-sub-interior-dea/
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Vessel No. 24
Name: LPV
Location: 335 miles off Costa Rica (Pacific Ocean)
Date: January 20, 2011

The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Midgett and its crew of 160, based in Seattle, intercepted the vessel
335 miles off Costa Rica (in the Pacific Ocean). The vessel was carrying 6.6 tons of cocaine.
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2015001894_narcosub09m.html
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Vessel No. 25
Name: 100 Foot Long Submarine
Location: Timbiqui, Cauca, Colombia
Date: February 2011

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/13/the-drug-war-at-sea-rise-of-the-narco-subs.html

http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html
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http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html

http://humanmindblower.wordpress.com/2011/02/19/colombian-narcotics/

100

http://boingboing.net/2011/02/14/100-ft-long-drug-smu.html
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http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?192796-Colombian-Armed-Forces-pics-videosand-more/page143

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?192796-Colombian-Armed-Forces-pics-videosand-more/page143
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http://www.sandiegored.com/noticias/5972/VIDEO-Advanced-narco-sub-seized-in-Colombia/

http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061934,00.html
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html

http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html
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Vessel No. 26
Name: Low Profile Vessel
Location: Eastern Pacific Ocean
Date: April 2011

http://defensetech.org/2011/04/20/another-drug-sub-is-caught-at-sea/
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Vessel No. 27
Name: Low Profile Vessel
Location: Near Buenaventura, Colombia
Date: September 2011

http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/27/two-new-narco-subs-found-in-colombia/
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http://rastreadordenoticias.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/submarino-farc.jpg

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2041685/That-sinking-feeling-Colombian-drug-cartels-latestweapon-captured--submarine-maiden-voyage.html
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15051108
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Vessel No. 28
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard)
Location: Western Caribbean
Date: September 17, 2011

A crew member aboard a LPV surrenders after the craft was stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard
cutter Mohawk. The sub, already sinking after crew members scuttled it, had a cargo of cocaine
aboard.
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/09/28/coast-guard-stops-another-drug-sub-in-caribbean/
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Vessel No. 29
Name: Low Profile Vessel (Interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard)
Location: Western Caribbean Sea
Date: September 30, 2011

The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk interdicted the LPV in the Western Caribbean Sea
on Sept. 30, 2011, before its crew sank the vessel. Above is the photo of the sunken LPV.
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/10/28/coast-guard-recovers-7-tons-of-cocaine-from-drug-sub/

U.S. authorities proceeded to recover 7 tons of cocaine from the sunken vessel.
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/10/28/coast-guard-recovers-7-tons-of-cocaine-from-drug-sub/

111

Vessel No. 30
Name: Fully functional narco-submarine (“Snorkel” sub)
Location: Western Colombia
Date: 2011

http://www.ryot.org/drug-traffickers-using-submarines-to-move-product/32166

http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel/galleries/narco-sub-mystery/at/blue-submarine-726492/
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Vessel No. 31
Name: Unmanned Torpedo (7.5 meters long and 1.5 meters wide)
Location: 65 Km south of Buenaventura, Colombia
Date: May 2012

http://www.infobae.com/2012/05/29/1051363-colombia-hallaron-otro-submarino-narco
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Vessel No. 32
Name: Low Profile vessel (15 meters long and 3 meters wide)
Location: 60 miles from Rio Naya, Colombia
Date: January 2013

http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/narco-blog-narco-sub-with-crew-of4-captured-by-colombian-navy/20969/
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Vessel No. 33
Name: Submarine
Location: Near Ecuador – Colombia border
Date: October 2013

http://infosurhoy.com/en_GB/articles/saii/features/main/2013/10/23/feature-02

http://dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2013/10/31/cooperacionecuador-colombia
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http://www.cuencahighlife.com/post/2014/03/02/Cocaine-blues-Although-it-produces-almost-none-of-itsown-Ecuador-has-become-stopover-point-in-drug-trade.aspx
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Miscellaneous photographs

http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel/galleries/narco-sub-mystery/at/underwater-drug-vessel726491/

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/07/photogalleries/100713-cocaine-submarines-subssmuggling-drugs-world-crime-pictures/#/cocaine-sub-seized-captains-wheel_23282_600x450.jpg

http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/06/29/vbs.colombian.narcosubs/

125

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

http://www.ryot.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/WORLD_NEWS_DRUGS-SUBS_1_MI.jpg
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http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs

http://sundodgers.com/2013/01/17/columbia-uses-submarines-to-smuggle-drugs/
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html

http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs#8642
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http://natgeotv.com/ca/inside-cocaine-submarines/galleries/drug-subs#8643

http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html

http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html
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http://acidcow.com/pics/18622-inside-cocaine-smuggling-submarines-12-pics.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/world/americas/drug-smugglers-pose-underwater-challenge-incaribbean.html?_r=0
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Photo of the hold area of a submersible - near the bow of the vessel where the cocaine is stored.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18707501

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18707501
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris

Courtesy Captain Mark F. Morris
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http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696

http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/improved-cocaine-submarines-11238696
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Narco-sub clandestine construction facility in Puerto Escondido, Cordoba, Colombia
http://m.semana.com/nacion/galeria/narcosubmarinos-historia-contada-fotos/328992

Name: PLUTO (U.S. Department Homeland Security) - Training submarine
Location: United States (East and West coasts)
Date: 2008 thru present

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/09/120910112529.htm
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MAP OF INTERDICTIONS

This map shows the location where our 33 identified vessels, listed in our picture gallery, were
interdicted between 1993 and 2013.
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NARCO-VESSELS’ INTERDICTIONS OVER TIME
Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker
Type
Semi-Submersible
Year
(1) San Andres, COL
1993

Submersible

1994

(2) Santa Marta, COL

1995

(3) Cartagena, COL

LPVs

(4) Northern Colombia

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

(5) Facatativa, COL

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

(6) Pacific Ocean

2006

2007

(13) Buenaventura, COL

2008
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(7) Buenaventura, COL
(8) Pacific Ocean (near
Costa Rica)
(9) Pacific Ocean near
Colombia
(10) Colombia’s Pacific
Coast
(11) Colombia
(12) Guajira, COL
(14) Colombia’s Pacific
Coast
(15) Colombia
(16) Pacific Ocean (near
Mexico)
(17) Pacific Ocean (near
Guatemala)
(18) Tumaco, COL

Type
Year
2009

Semi-Submersible

2010

Submersible

(23) Colombia-Ecuador
border
(25) Cauca, COL
(30) Western Colombia

2011

2012

(31) Buenaventura, COL

2013

(33) Near ColombiaEcuador border

Total

1

10
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LPVs
(19) Pacific Ocean (near
Colombia-Ecuador
border)
(20) Caribbean Sea
(21) Eastern Pacific off
the coast of
Central America
(22) Pacific coast (near
Colombia)
(24) Near Costa Rica
(Pacific Ocean)
(26)Eastern Pacific
Ocean
(27) Buenaventura, COL
(28) Western Caribbean
(29) Western Caribbean
Sea
(32) Southwestern
Colombia
22
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Introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and other distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. Illicit trafficking
poses a serious threat to our national security, presenting a formidable challenge not only for the
United States but for our international partners as well. Our borders are being assailed by a
dangerous adversary that is well-resourced, adaptive, and experienced at exploiting all avenues of
approach to the United States. These transnational criminal networks employ all modes and means
of conveyance across all transportation domains to reach U.S. and global markets. The challenge
is daunting.
Illicit trafficking threatens our country at every land, air, and sea border and challenges the
sovereignty of our many international partners. In particular, the tactics, techniques, and
procedures employed by drug traffickers are methodologies that can be used by anyone wanting
to move illicit people and/or cargo – including terrorists. The established routes, proven methods
of conveyances, built-in logistics, communications, and command and control networks could be
leveraged by a variety of groups seeking to do harm to the United States. While this potential
exists, to date, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) and U.S. Southern Command
have not seen any indication of terrorist organizations or their affiliates using illicit trafficking
networks to reach the United States to commit acts of terrorism. We continue to monitor this
possibility closely.
JIATF-South has broad legal authorities to conduct detection and monitoring operations against
illicit trafficking in order to hand off targets to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. The
highest priorities are nationally nominated targets of interest, from weapons of mass destruction
to special interest aliens and high value targets. The next tier down comprises a broad spectrum of
transnational threats, to include the cocaine trade that by itself is worth an estimated $85 billion
globally1. Staggering amounts of revenue and profit allow transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) to challenge nations by exacerbating corruption and undermining governance, rule of law,
judicial systems, free press, democratic institution-building, and transparency, as indicated in the
2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) 2. Cocaine is still one of the
most lucrative forms of profit for TCOs and is produced in marketable volumes and quality in
three countries in South America: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia 3 Peru and Bolivia have the potential
to produce 41 percent and 25 percent of the total cocaine volume respectively, and Colombia
potentially produces 34 percent 4. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), of the
United States drug seizures subjected to forensic analysis, 97 percent comes from Colombia 5, and
it is this specific flow that threatens Central America, Mexico, and the United States.
With a homicide rate of 82 per 100,000 6, Honduras is the most dangerous country in the world,
including the current zones of conflict in the Middle East. San Pedro Sula, Honduras has a
1
2
3
4

5
6

UNODC World Drug Report 2011.
The White House. President Obama’s Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.
2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement. Potential production is assessed by arable hectares available for coca
growth.
DEA. Analysis of Cocaine Price and Quality.
UNODC 2011 Homicide Rates by Country.

homicide rate of 159 deaths per 100,000 citizens, surpassing Ciudad Juarez, Mexico as the world’s
most violent city7. Violent TCOs and gang activity, supported by the flow of cocaine and other
contraband towards the United States and the rest of the global market, are negatively impacting
citizen security. As illicit drugs move outward to the consuming markets, the money from illicit
drug transactions returns to the source and transit regions, creating instability within our partner
countries by promoting corruption and undermining legitimate financial institutions. My statutory
focus as Director of JIATF-South is combating the illicit drug trade by detecting the flow of drugs
early in the supply chain and facilitating interdiction as far from our borders as possible, before
illicit drugs are broken down into small, harder-to-detect load sizes. Operation MARTILLO is the
focusing lens of a whole-of-government, international solution to this significant regional threat to
national security. Coordinated by JIATF-South to support the President’s CTOC strategy,
Operation MARTILLO seeks to deny the use of the Central American littorals by TCOs while
maximizing the drug interdiction efforts of our interagency partners in the principal geographic
corridor through which the bulk of illicit drugs moves toward the United States.
Drug Movement in the Transit Zone: Go-Fasts, Semi-Submersibles and Fully Submersibles
JIATF-South challenges drug traffickers in the air and on the sea 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
in defense of America’s borders. We are relentless and committed while operating in a resourceconstrained environment. Our goal is to put drug traffickers at risk of interdiction and arrest at
each and every step of their journey. We work very hard in constant support of law enforcement
to ensure this all occurs seamlessly with the most effective use of our resources. Through better
intelligence, technological innovations, and unprecedented interagency and international
partnerships, JIATF-South has supported record cocaine disruptions, totaling 1,997 metric tons
over the last ten years 8.
From all indications, eighty percent of cocaine, bound for the United States, transits initially via
maritime methods of conveyance, while the remaining 20percent makes its first moves by air 9.
Today, Honduras is the primary initial arrival point for cocaine as it leaves the source zone; in
2011, approximate 35 percent of the world’s cocaine supply made its first landfall there 10. Once
on land, larger loads are eventually broken down into smaller packages before entering the United
States. The Mexico/Central American corridor, which includes the waters of the Eastern Pacific
and Western Caribbean, is the primary threat vector toward the United States, accounting for more
than 90 percent of total documented cocaine movement 11.
Cocaine from the source zone moves by a number of conveyances, the primary being go-fasts,
usually open hulled boats anywhere from 20 to 50 feet in length with one to four powerful outboard
engines. Carrying anywhere from 300 kilograms to 3.5 metric tons of cocaine, these vessels
typically leave Colombia and follow the Western Caribbean coastline of Central America to make
landfall, principally in Honduras. In the Eastern Pacific, the same types of vessels will leave

7

Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad, Justicia y Paz Penal A.C. (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice),
Mexico, 2011.
8 JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB).
9 JISTF-South case analysis.
10 JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB).
11 JIATF-South analysis of Interagency Consolidated Counter-Drug Database (CCDB).
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Colombia or Ecuador, and transit off-shore to Guatemala and Mexico or follow the coastline to
Panama or Costa Rica.
In 2011, the interagency’s Consolidated Counter Drug Database (CCDB) indicated that there were
568 go-fast events moving 490 metric tons of cocaine from South America toward the United
States. Ninety-four percent of those movements were along the Central American isthmus into
Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico 12. This massive volume moving off-shore and often through the
countries of Central America is contributing to the instability and corruption seen in northern
Central America, Mexico, and along our Southwest Border.
Though not present in the same numbers as go-fasts, the Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSS)
and Fully Submersible Vessels (FSV) are potentially an even more insidious threat to the security
of the United States for two reasons: (1) their large, up to 10-ton payload capacity and (2) the
extraordinary difficulty of detecting these vessels at sea. This makes them a dangerous drug
conveyance that could potentially be adapted for transporting other more serious security threats
to the United States 13.
The SPSS is typically constructed in undergoverned spaces, often in the sparsely populated
mangrove estuaries of Western Colombia and Ecuador. Costing less than a million dollars apiece
to construct, they can move enough cocaine in a single trip to generate more than $100 million in
illicit proceeds for the traffickers 14. JIATF-South detected an SPSS at sea for the first time in 2006.
By 2009, the interagency detected as many as 60 SPSS events were moving as much as 330 metric
tons per year. Prior to 2011, SPSS had only been employed by traffickers in the Eastern Pacific.
However, since July 2011, JIATF-South has supported the disruption of five SPSS vessels in the
Western Caribbean, each carrying more than 6.5 metric tons of cocaine.
There have been a total of 214 documented SPSS events, but only 45 were disrupted due largely
to the difficulty of detecting such low-profile vessels 15. The Congress, deserves a note of thanks
for its foresight and wisdom in enacting 18 USC § 2285, the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction
Act of 2008, which made the mere operation of these stateless vessels in international waters a
crime. This has greatly helped interdiction efforts because it eliminated the necessity for law
enforcement authorities to recover contraband in order to affect successful arrests and
prosecutions.
The SPSS was an evolutionary step in the creation of a covert capability to transport multi-ton
loads of contraband without any logistical support or refueling. This capability is now present in
the FSV. These vessels can get underway from the source region, fully loaded with up to 10 metric
tons of cocaine and a crew of four, and travel up to 6,800 nautical miles unsupported 16. Though
there is currently no intelligence of shipments directly to the United States, this is a range capacity
that can take an FSV from the west coast of Colombia to the coast near Los Angeles, or from the
north coast of Colombia to Galveston. Unlike the SPSS, the FSV power plants are typically
complex diesel-electric systems that allow them to operate submerged by day on battery power
12
13
14
15
16

Interagency Consolidated Counter-Drug Database (CCDB).
Office of Naval Intelligence, Assessments of seized SPSS and FSVs.
JIATF-South and Office of Naval Intelligence assessment of seized SPSS.
Interagency CCDB
Office of Naval Intelligence, Assessments of seized FSVs.
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and to run on the surface at night while recharging their batteries. As complex and sophisticated
as they may appear, FSVs are constructed in the same undergoverned locations as SPSSs. These
areas are very difficult for law enforcement or even military forces to reach. However, three FSVs
have been seized in remote jungle areas, the first in Ecuador in 2010, and the last two in Colombia.
Each of these three vessels was unique in its construction and had cargo capacities of over seven
metric tons. In 2011, the Interagency documented three FSV movements, none of which were
successfully interdicted 17.
Operation MARTILLO: Supporting Regional Stability/National Security
Record interdiction years in the mid-2000s caused TCOs to react and mitigate their risk in several
ways. SPSSs and FSVs were developed and their operations refined. Go-fast load sizes were
reduced while the number of events increased significantly. Most alarmingly, TCO operations at
sea were moved from deep water, where technological advantages favored U.S. interdiction forces,
to the Central American littorals 18.
This operational migration toward the Central American isthmus created an increasingly difficult
and destabilizing situation whereby primary drug movements from the source zone made landfall
earlier, often in countries incapable of stopping them. Operating in and around the territorial waters
of Central America made international cooperation and bi-lateral agreements all the more critical
to our success.
To counter this shift in flow and to alleviate pressure on Central American countries, Operation
MARTILLO began in earnest on 15 January 2012. It is one component of a U.S. whole-ofgovernment approach to counter the spread of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) in Central
America. By demonstrating a consistent presence in the littorals of Central America, the United
States, and our international partners seek to force TOC networks to move their transshipment
routes to deeper waters in the Pacific and Caribbean. Operation MARTILLO demonstrates a clear
commitment on the part of Western Hemisphere nations and other allies to work together to combat
the spread of TCOs, and to protect their citizens from the violence, harm and exploitation wrought
by TCO networks. Operation MARTILLO created a framework whereby complementary
operations by partner nations and other U. S. government agencies could increase the effectiveness
and synergy against TCOs in a difficult budget and operating environment.
Since 15 January, JIATF-South has documented significant decreases in the flow of illicit drugs
in the Central American corridor (see graphic above). Compared to the same period in 2011, the
JIATF South documented flow of illicit drugs in the Central American corridor dropped by 46
metric tons. While cocaine flow is down in most of the region, we did note a significant increase
in activity in the Eastern Pacific littorals which we attribute to increased awareness of tracks
brought by enhanced focus of our interagency and international partners in the region 19. Our law
enforcement partners are expending great effort to provide actionable information to support the
operation. This translates to a significantly increased awareness of the movement of cocaine over
previous years.
17
18
19

Interagency CCDB.
2010 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.
JIATF-South analysis of CCDB and JIATF-South case analysis.
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The overall significant decrease in movement indicates an impact on the traffickers caused by the
presence of U.S. ships and aircraft, the efforts of our law enforcement partners and those of our
allies and partner nations in the region. Further illustrating the commitment of our hemispheric
partners, I note that partner nations have participated in 83 percent of disrupted events, acting as a
force multiplier and playing an enormous role in the success of the operation. Though we have not
yet seen the traffickers shift to another region in the Joint Operating Area, we assess that a
continued persistent presence over time will force them to change their tactics and we are prepared
to respond to that shift when the time comes.
Closing
Our target set spans the full spectrum of national and international security, presenting a
formidable transnational challenge for U.S. and allied nations. We fight a highly mobile,
disciplined, and well-funded adversary that threatens democratic governments, terrorizes
populations, impedes economic development, and creates regional instability. The mission to
counter transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking cannot be viewed in isolation from our
efforts to combat terrorism, because the patterns, tactics, and techniques employed by traffickers
are the same as the methodologies used by anyone wanting to move illicit people or cargo including terrorists.
Our operational successes indicate an increasing level of trafficker sophistication and innovation
as they rapidly employ readily available cutting edge technologies, change their tactics, and shift
seamlessly between modes of communication and methods of conveyance. Our success is
dependent upon our collective capability to be more innovative, more adaptive, and more agile
than our adversaries. Currently, we are unable to target 74 percent of high confidence events. Of
the 26 percent that we are able to target the principle impediment to successful detection and
monitoring is the lack of the necessary sensors to generate persistent wide area surveillance and
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precision geolocation. In spite of our challenges, we continue to be successful for two primary
reasons. First, JIATF-South is a dynamic and evolutionary organization, one continuously
adapting itself to evolving target sets. Second, the national and international unity of effort found
within our command spans geographical and functional boundaries, bringing with it operational
efficiencies and critical capabilities.
I close by once again thanking the Congress for its steadfast support of our men and women in
uniform, who work every day to keep our nation safe and I look forward to our continued
collaboration to counter transnational organized crime and the illicit traffic that supports it.
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF AREA WHERE NARCO SUBMARINES ARE
BUILT IN COLOMBIA

http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/war-for-cocaine-corridors-consumes-colombiasbusiest-port
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF MOVEMENT OF COCAINE INTO THE U.S.

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM11/20130226/100300/HHRG-113-HM11-Wstate-LeeW20130226.pdf
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